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Abstract
Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the se-
curity of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smart-
phones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code.
Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of
the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to
prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must provide
time protection, the temporal equivalent of the established
memory protection, for isolating security domains. We ex-
amine the requirements of time protection, present a design
and its implementation in the seL4 microkernel, and evaluate
efficacy and cost on x86 and Arm processors.
CCS Concepts • Security and privacy→ Trusted com-
puting; • Software and its engineering→ Multiprocess-
ing / multiprogramming / multitasking;
Keywords timing channels, covert channels, temporal iso-
lation, time protection, microkernels, security, confidential-
ity, seL4
1 Introduction
One of the oldest problems in operating systems (OS) re-
search is how to confine programs so they do not leak infor-
mation [Lampson 1973]. To achieve confinement, the operat-
ing system needs to control all of the means of communica-
tion that the program can use. For that purpose, programs are
typically grouped into security domains, with the operating
system exerting control on cross-domain communication.
Programs can bypass OS protection by sending informa-
tion over media not intended for communication. Histori-
cally, such covert channels were explored in the context of
military systems [Department of Defence 1986]. Cloud com-
puting, smartphone apps and server-provided JavaScript
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mean that we now routinely share computing platforms with
untrusted, potentially malicious, third-party code.
OSes have traditionally enforced security throughmemory
protection, i.e. spatial isolation of security domains. Recent
advances include formal proof of spatial security enforce-
ment by the seL4 microkernel [Klein et al. 2014], including
proof of the absence of covert storage channels [Murray et al.
2013], i.e. channels based on storing information that can
be later loaded [Department of Defence 1986; Schaefer et al.
1977]. Spatial isolation is therefore a solved problem.
In contrast, timing channels, and in particular microar-
chitectural channels [Ge et al. 2018b], which exploit timing
variations due to shared use of caches and other hardware, re-
main a fundamental OS security challenge that has eluded a
comprehensive solution to date. Its importance is highlighted
by recent attacks, including the extraction of encryption keys
across cores through side channels [Irazoqui et al. 2015; Liu
et al. 2015], i.e. without the cooperation of the key owner.
In contrast, covert channels depend on insider help and
are traditionally considered a less significant threat. How-
ever, in the recent Spectre attack [Kocher et al. 2019], an
adversary uses a covert communication channel with a Tro-
jan constructed from speculatively executed gadgets to leak
information. This demonstrates that covert channels pose
a real security risk even where no side-channel attack is
known. Furthermore, a covert channel bears the risk of be-
ing exploitable as a side channel by an ingenious attacker.
We argue that it is time to take temporal isolation seri-
ously, and make the OS1 responsible for time protection, the
prevention of temporal interference [Ge et al. 2018a], just
as memory protection prevents spatial interference. This re-
quires a design that eliminate, as far as possible, the sharing
of hardware resources that is the underlying cause of timing
channels. Ultimately we aim to obtain temporal isolation
guarantees comparable to the spatial isolation proofs of seL4,
but for now we focus on a mechanisms that are suitable for
a verifiable OS kernel, i.e. minimal, general and policy-free.
Specifically, we make the following contributions.
• We define time protection for preventing microarchi-
tectural timing channels, and specify the requirements
for its implementation (Section 3.2);
1Weuse “OS” to refer to themost privileged software level that is responsible
for security enforcement, which could be a hypervisor.
1
• we introduce a policy-free kernel clone operation that
partitions a system almost perfectly, removing most
sharing between domains, and explore how accessing
the remaining shared state can be made sufficiently
deterministic to prevent leakage (Section 3.3);
• we present an implementation in seL4 (Section 4);
• we show that our implementation of time protection
is effective, transparently removing timing channels,
within limitations of present hardware (Section 5.3);
• we show that the overhead is low (Section 5.4).
2 Background
2.1 Covert channels and side channels
A covert channel is an information flow that uses a mecha-
nism not intended for information transfer [Lampson 1973].
By allowing communication between security domains that
should be isolated, covert channels may violate the system’s
security policy. Here a (security) domain is the granular-
ity of restrictions imposed by a system’s security policy;
it may consists of multiple OS protection domains (set of
access rights), which may further restrict access for software-
engineering/safety reasons.
There is a traditional distinction between storage and tim-
ing channels, where exploitation of the latter requires the
communicating domains to have a common notion of time
[Department of Defence 1986; Schaefer et al. 1977; Wray
1991]. In principle, it is possible to completely eliminate stor-
age channels, as was done in the information-flow proof of
seL4 [Murray et al. 2013].2
Despite progress on proving upper bounds for the cache
side channels of cryptographic implementations [Doychev
et al. 2013; Köpf et al. 2012], proofs of elimination of timing
channels in a non-trivial system are beyond current formal
approaches; measurements are essential for their analysis.
In a narrow sense, a covert channel requires collusion be-
tween the domains, one acting as a sender and the other as
a receiver. Typical cases of senders are Trojans, i.e. trusted
code that operates maliciously, or untrusted code that is be-
ing confined [Lampson 1973]. Due to the collusion, a covert
channel represents a worst case for bandwidth of a channel.
In contrast, a side channel has an unwitting sender, called
the victim, which, through its normal operation, is leaking
information to an attacker acting as the receiver. An impor-
tant example is a victim executing in a virtual machine (VM)
on a public cloud, which is being attacked by a malicious
co-resident VM [İnci et al. 2016; Yarom and Falkner 2014].
The achievable bandwidth of a side channel attack is gen-
erally orders of magnitude lower than the covert channel
using the same mechanism. Bandwidth is obviously less of
2Specifically, the proof shows that no machine state that is touched by
the kernel can be used as a storage channel, it does not exclude channels





Figure 1. Competition for limited hardware resources result
in interference that can leak information intra-core (Dom0
to Dom1) or inter-core (Dom0 to Dom2).
an issue if the secret is a small but long-lived asset, such as
a web server’s SSL key.
2.2 Microarchitectural channels
Microarchitectural timing channels result from competition
for hardware resources that are functionally transparent to
software [Ge et al. 2018b]. The instruction-set architecture
(ISA), i.e. the hardware-software contract, abstracts these
resources away, as they are irrelevant for functional correct-
ness. However, the abstraction leaks, as it affects observable
execution speed, leading to timing channels.
These resources come in two categories, see Figure 1.
1. Microarchitectural state leverages temporal and
spatial locality improve average-case performance. It
includes data and instruction caches, TLBs, branch
predictors, instruction- and data-prefetcher state ma-
chines, and DRAM row buffers. Without hyperthread-
ing, core-local resources are time-shared, else they are
concurrently accessed like shared caches.
2. Stateless interconnects include busses and on-chip
networks. Time sharing cannot produce interference
on these, while concurrent access can be observed as
a reduction of available bandwidth.
Cache channels work by the sender (intentionally or inci-
dentally) modulating its footprint in the cache through its
execution, and the receiver probing this footprint by system-
atically touching cache lines and measuring memory latency
by observing its own execution speed. Low latency means
that a line is still in the cache from an earlier access, while
high latency means that the corresponding line has been
replaced by the sender competing for cache space.
Side-channel attacks are similar, except that the sender
does not actively cooperate, but accesses cache lines accord-
ing to its computational needs. Thus, the attacker must syn-
chronise its attack with the victim’s execution and eliminate
any noise with more advanced techniques. Side-channel at-
tacks have been demonstrated against the L1-D [Hu 1992]
and L1-I caches [Acıiçmez 2007], the TLB [Gras et al. 2018;
Hund et al. 2013] and the BP [Acıiçmez et al. 2007]. Cross-
core side-channel attacks through the last-level cache (LLC)
have also been demonstrated [Irazoqui et al. 2015; Liu et al.
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2015; Maurice et al. 2017]. Side-channel attacks through hy-
perthreading are plentiful [Acıiçmez and Seifert 2007; Perci-
val 2005; Yarom et al. 2016].
On stateless channels, the sender encodes information
into its bandwidth consumption, and the receiver senses the
available bandwidth. Interconnects have been exploited as
covert channel to date [Hu 1991; Wu et al. 2012], no side-
channel attacks are known [Ge et al. 2018b]; as long as the
interconnect does not leak data or address information, they
are probably infeasible.3
2.3 Countermeasures
Countermeasures must prevent interference resulting from
resource competition while processing secret information.
The OS can prevent interference on stateful resources
by flushing between accesses or by partitioning.4 Flushing is
conceptually simple (but potentially difficult in practice, see
Section 4.3). Flushing can obviously not help with concurrent
access to a shared cache, it would also be very costly in the
case of large caches (LLC), as we demonstrate in Section 5.2.
Partitioning by the OS is only possible where the OS has
control over how domains access the shared infrastructure.
This is the case in physically-indexed caches (generally the
L2. . . LLC), as the OS controls the allocation of physical mem-
ory frames to domains, and thus the physical addresses. The
standard technique is page colouring, which makes use of the
fact that in large set-associative caches, the set-selector bits
in the address overlap with the page number. A particular
page can therefore only ever be resident in a specific section
of the cache, referred to as the “colour” of the page. The
OS can partition the physically-indexed cache by allocating
frames of disjoint colours to domains [Kessler and Hill 1992;
Liedtke et al. 1997; Lynch et al. 1992]. With a page size of P ,
a cache of size S and associativityw has S/wP colours.
On most hardware the OS cannot colour the small L1
caches, because they only have a single colour, but also be-
cause they are generally indexed by virtual address, which is
not under OS control. The same applies to the other on-core
state, such as the TLB and BP. Hence, if domains share a core,
these on-core caches must be flushed on a domain switch.
Some architectures provide hardware mechanisms for par-
titioning caches. For example, many Arm processors support
pinning whole sets of the L1 I- and D-caches [ARM Ltd. 2008].
Prior work has used this feature to provide a small amount
of safe, on-chip memory for storing encryption keys [Colp
et al. 2015]. Similarly, Intel recently introduced a feature
called cache allocation technology (CAT), which supports
3A recently published bus side-channel attack [Wang and Suh 2012] was
only demonstrated in a simulator. More importantly, it relies on the cache
being small, making it inapplicable to modern processors.
4In principle, it is also possible to prevent timing channels by denying
attackers access to real time, but in practice this is infeasible except in
extremely constrained scenarios.
way-based partitioning of the LLC, and which also can be
used to provide secure memory [Liu et al. 2016].
Although such securememory areas can be used to protect
secrets from side channels, they need to be actively (and cor-
rectly) used by the application holding the secret. However,
enforcement of a system’s security policy must not depend
on correct application behaviour. Hence time protection, like
memory protection, must be a mandatory (black-box) OS
security enforcement mechanism. In particular, only manda-
tory enforcement can support confinement.
For bandwidth-limited interconnects, channel pre-
vention requires partitioning the bandwith, by time-
multiplexing the interconnect or by using some hardware
partitioning mechanism. No support for bandwidth partition-
ing exists on contemporary mainstream hardware.5 Time-
multiplex the interconnect by the OS explicitly managing
cache content [Yun et al. 2013] comes at the cost of severely
degraded interconnect utilisation.
2.4 seL4
seL4 is a third-generation OS microkernel that is designed
from the ground up for use in security- and safety-critical sys-
tems. Its unique assurance includes formal, machine-checked
proofs that the implementation (at the level of the executable
binary) is functionally correct against a formal model, and
that the formal model enforces integrity and confidentiality
(ignoring timing channels) [Klein et al. 2014].
Like other security-oriented systems [Bomberger et al.
1992; Shapiro et al. 1999], seL4 uses capabilities [Dennis and
Van Horn 1966] for access control: any access must be autho-
rised by an appropriate capability. seL4 takes a somewhat
extreme view of policy-mechanism separation [Levin et al.
1975], by delegating all memory management to user level.
After booting up, the kernel never allocates memory; it has
no heap and uses a strictly bounded stack. Any memory that
is free after the kernel boots is handed to the initial usermode
process as “Untyped” (meaning unused) memory.
Memory needed by the kernel for object metadata, includ-
ing page tables, thread control blocks (TCBs) and capability
storage, must be supplied by the usermode process which
creates the need for it. For example, if a process wants to cre-
ate a new thread, besides providing memory for that thread’s
stack, also it must hand to the kernel memory for storing
the TCB. This is done by “re-typing” some Untyped mem-
ory into the TCB kernel object type. While userland now
holds a capability to a kernel object, it cannot access its data
directly. Instead, the capability is the authentication token
for performing system calls on the object (e.g. manipulating
a thread’s scheduling parameters) or destroying the object
(and thereby recovering the original Untyped memory).
5Intel recently introduced memory bandwidth allocation (MBA) technology,
which imposes approximate limits on the memory bandwidth available to a
core [Intel Corporation 2016]. While a step towards bandwidth partitioning,
the approximate enforcement is insufficient for preventing covert channels.
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Figure 2. seL4’s memory management model extends parti-
tioning of user memory to kernel metadata.
This model of memory management has profound con-
sequences, it is an enabler of the proofs about seL4’s isola-
tion enforcement. For example, the initial process might do
nothing but partition free memory into two pools, initiate a
process in each pool, giving it complete control over its pool
but no access to anything else, and then commit suicide. This
system will then remain strictly (and provably) partitioned
for the rest of its life, with no (overt) means of communica-
tion between the partitions. Furthermore, as kernel metadata
is stored in memory provided to the kernel by userland, it is
as partitioned as userland (see Figure 2).
3 Attacks and Defences
3.1 Threat scenarios
We aim to develop general time-protection mechanisms suit-
able for a wide range of use cases. However, we note the lack
of hardware support for preventing interconnect channels
(see Section 2.3). Recalling that these can only be exploited
as covert channels between from concurrently executing do-
mains, we have to restrict ourselves to threat scenarios which
exclude these kinds of channels. Once suitable hardware sup-
port becomes available, time protection can be generalised.
Even with this restriction we can provide security to many
important use cases. We pick two threat scenarios which
represent important use cases.
3.1.1 Confinement
The confinement scenario [Lampson 1973] uses mandatory
security enforcement to stop a Trojan from leaking secrets.
The Trojan may be malicious or compromised code in a
library, third-party app, server-supplied JavaScript, or low-
assurance code in a military-style cross-domain device, or
it could be constructed from gadgets in a Spectre attack. A
confined component would run in a security domain of its
own, connected to the rest of the system by explicit (e.g. IPC)
input and output channels.
To avoid the interconnect channel, we have to assume that
the system either runs on a single core (at least while the
sensitive code is executing), or co-schedules domains across
the cores, such that at any time only one domain executes.
3.1.2 Cloud
A public cloud hosts VMs belonging to mutually-distrusting
clients executing concurrently on the same processor. As
the VMs are able to communicate with the outside world,
covert channels are impossible to prevent, so the intercon-
nect channel is of no relevance. Instead we aim to prevent
side channels, where an attacking VM is trying to infer se-
crets held by a victim VM.
Hyperthreading is fundamentally based on improving
throughput by sharing resources between execution con-
texts; partitioning those resources would result in separate
cores. Timing channels between hyperthreads are thus inher-
ent, and we assume that hyperthreading is either disabled or
that all hyperthreads of a core belong to the same VM. This is
consistent with advice from hypervisor providers [Marshall
et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2012]. We do allow time-multiplexing
a core between domains.
Characteristic of the cloud scenario is that it is very
performance-sensitive. The business model of the cloud is
fundamentally based on maximising resource utilisation,
which rules out restrictions such as not sharing processors
between VMs. This also means that solutions that lead to sig-
nificant overall performance degradation are not acceptable.
3.2 Time protection
We propose time protection to address these threats.
Definition: Time protection
A collection of OSmechanismwhich jointly prevent in-
terference between security domains that would make
execution speed in one domain dependent on the ac-
tivities of another.
Time protection must partition concurrently shared re-
sources and flush or partition time-multiplexed resources
during domain switches. As discussed in Section 2.3, flushing
the virtually indexed on-core state (L1, TLB, BP) is unavoid-
able where a core is time-multiplexed between domains.
Requirement 1: Flush on-core state
When time-sharing a core, the OS must flush on-core
microarchitectural state on domain switch, unless the
hardware supports partitioning such state.
Other core-private state, such as the (physically addressed)
L2 in Intel processors, could be flushed or partitioned. Hard-
ware resources shared between cores, in particular the LLC,
must be partitioned by the OS (e.g. using page colouring).
Flushing cannot prevent interference through concurrent
accesses, as they happen in our Cloud scenario. Flushing the
LLC would also introduce high overhead (see Section 5.2).
Page colouring rules out sharing of physical frames be-
tween domains, whether explicitly or transparently via page
deduplication, and thus may increase the aggregate mem-
ory footprint of the system. However, this is unavoidable, as
even (read-only) sharing of code has been shown to produce
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exploitable side channels [Gullasch et al. 2011; Yarom and
Falkner 2014]. We are not aware of any public cloud provider
that supports cross-VM deduplication and some hypervi-
sor providers explicitly discourage the practice [VMware
Knowledge Base 2014] due to the risks it presents.
This leaves the kernel itself. Similar to shared libraries, the
kernel’s code and data can also be used as a timing channel,
we will demonstrate this in Section 5.3.1.
Requirement 2: Partition the kernel
Each domain must have its private copy of kernel text,
stack and (as much as possible) global data.
As discussed in Section 2.4, partitioning most kernel data
is straightforward in seL4: all dynamically allocated kernel
memory is provided by userland. Hence, colouring user mem-
orywill colour all dynamic kernel data structures. This leaves
an (in seL4 small) amount of global kernel data uncoloured.
Requirement 3: Deterministic data sharing
Access to remaining shared kernel data must be deter-
ministic enough to prevent information leakage.
The latency of flushing on-core caches can also be used
as a channel, as we will show in Section 5.3.4. The reason is
that flushing the L1-D cache forces a write-back of all dirty
lines, which means that the latency depends on the amount
of dirty data, and thus on the execution history:
Requirement 4: Flush deterministically
Cache flushing mut be padded to its worst-case latency.
Interrupts could also be used for a covert channel, as we
will demonstrate in Section 5.3.5. These are irrelevant to
the cloud scenario, as there is no evidence that interrupts
could be used as side channels, they are likely infeasible as
an interrupt carries little data. Hence interrupt channels are
only a concern intra-core.
Requirement 5: Partition interrupts
When sharing a core, the kernel must disable or parti-
tion any interrupts other than the preemption timer.
Strategies for satisfying most of these requirements are
well understood. We will now describe an approach that
satisfies Requirement 2, Requirement 5 and simplifies Re-
quirement 3 as a side effect. Remember from Section 1 that
we are looking for mechanisms that are simple and policy-
free, to make them suitable for a verifiable kernel.
3.3 Partitioning the OS: Cloning the kernel
Requirement 2 demands per-domain copies of the kernel. It
would certainly be possible to structure a system at boot-
image configuration time, such that each domain is given
a separate kernel text segment, as in some NUMA sys-
tems [Concurrent Real Time 2012]. The domains would still
share global kernel data, which then requires careful han-
dling as per Requirement 3. The latter can be simplified
by reducing the amount of shared global kernel data to a
minimum, and replicate as much of it as possible between
kernel instances, resulting in something resembling a multi-
kernel [Baumann et al. 2009] on a single core, although more
extreme in that kernel text is also separate.
This approach would imply completely static partitioning,
where the configuration of domains, and thus the system’s
security policy, is baked into the boot image. As changes of
policy would require changes to the kernel itself, this reduces
the degree of assurance (or increases its cost). Furthermore,
such a static approach would not suit the Cloud scenario:
while the domain of a terminated VM could be recycled for
a newly created one, the total number of VM slots would be
fixed, forcing the system to over-provision domains just in
case more might be needed.
We therefore favour an approach where the kernel is igno-
rant of the specific security policy, only one kernel configu-
ration (which should eventually be completely verified) is
ever used, the security policy is defined by the initial user
process (as is the case with the present seL4 kernel), and
where domains can be added or removed on demand.
We can achieve this by introducing a policy-free kernel
clonemechanism. Its high-level description is creating a copy
of a kernel image in user-supplied memory, including a stack
and replicas of almost all global kernel data. The initial user
process, serving as resource and security manager, can use
kernel clone to set up an almost perfectly partitioned system.
Specifically, the initial process separates all free memory
into coloured pools, one per domain, clones a kernel for
each partition into memory from the domain’s pool, starts a
child process in each pool, and associates the child with the
corresponding kernel image.
The existing mechanisms of seL4 are sufficient to guar-
antee that the system will remain coloured for its lifetime,
e.g. if init commits suicide. Cloning can be undone as long
as a process with authority over a kernel image remains
runnable. Re-partitioning is possible by moving memory
colours between partitions or revoking a complete kernel
image. Partitioning can be nested: a partition can sub-divide
with new kernel clones, as long as it has sufficient Untyped
memory and more than one page colour left.
4 Implementation in seL4
4.1 Kernel clone overview
In seL4, all access is controlled by capabilities. To control
cloning, we introduce a new object type, Kernel_Image,
which represents a kernel. A holder of a clone capability
to a Kernel_Image object, with access to sufficient Untyped
memory, can clone the kernel. A Kernel_Image can be de-
stroyed like any other object, and revoking a Kernel_Image
capability destroys all kernels cloned from it.
We introduce another object type, Kernel_Memory, which
represents physical memory that can be mapped to a kernel
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image, analogous to the existing Frame type, which repre-
sents memory that can be mapped into a user address space.
At boot time, the kernel creates a Kernel_Image master
capability, which represents the present (and only) kernel and
includes the clone right. It hands this capability, together
with the size of the image, to the initial user process. That
thread can then partition the system into security domains,
by first partitioning its Untypedmemory by colour. For each
domain it clones a new kernel from the initial one, using
some of the domain’s memory pool, sets up an initial address
space and thread in each of them, associates the threads with
the respective kernels, and makes them runnable. The initial
process can prevent other threads from cloning kernels by
handing them only derived Kernel_Image capabilities with
the clone right stripped.
Cloning consists of three steps. (1) The user process re-
types some Untyped into an (uninitialised) Kernel_Image
and Kernel_Memory of sufficient size, (2) it allocates an
address space identifier (ASID) to the uninitialised Ker-
nel_Image, (3) it invokes Kernel_Clone on the new Ker-
nel_Image, passing an (existing) Kernel_Image capability
with clone right and a Kernel_Memory capability as param-
eters, resulting in an initialised Kernel_Image.
Cloning copies the source kernel’s code, read-only data
(incl. interrupt vector table etc.) and stack. It also creates a
new idle thread and a new kernel address space; the seL4
kernel has an address space that contains the kernel objects
resulting from retype operations. This means that the Ker-
nel_Image is represented as the root of the kernel’s address
space, plus an ASID. Hence, any cloned Kernel_Image can
independently handle any system calls, receive interrupts
(Section 4.2) and system timer ticks, and run an idle thread
when no user thread is runnable on a core. We add the capa-
bility of the kernel responsible for handling its system call
to each thread’s TCB.
Two kernels share only the minimum static data required
for handing over the processor. On seL4, this is (numbers
indicate size per core on x64, total of about 9.5 KiB):
1. the scheduler’s array of head pointers to per-priority
ready queues (4 KiB), as well as the bitmap used to find
the highest-priority thread in constant time (32 B)
2. the current scheduling decision (8 B)
3. the tables of IRQ state interrupt handlers (2 × 1.1KiB)
4. the interrupt currently being handled, if any (8 B)
5. the first-level hardware ASID table (1.1 KiB)
6. the IO port control table (2 KiB, x86 only)
7. the pointers for the current thread, its capability store
(Cspace), the current kernel, idle thread, and the thread
currently owning the floating point unit (40 B)
8. the kernel lock for SMP (8 B)
9. the barrier used for inter-processor interrupts (8 B).
We perform an audit of the shared data to ensure it cannot
be used as a cross-core side channel. Specifically, we deter-
mine for all such data the circumstances (interrupt handling,
context switch) under which the kernel will access it. We
then establish that none of the cache lines involved contain
or are accessed through private user information (such as
address-space layout).
4.2 Partitioning interrupts
To support Requirement 5, we assign interrupt sources to a
Kernel_Image. Interrupts (other than the kernel’s preemp-
tion timer) are controlled by IRQ_Handler capabilities; the
Kernel_SetInt system call allows associating an IRQ with
a kernel. At any time, only the preemption timer and in-
terrupts associated with the current Kernel_Image can be
unmasked, this prevents kernels from triggering interrupts
across partition boundaries.
Partitioning is policy, and the kernel will not force all
IRQs to be partitioned. Associating an IRQ with multiple
domains is valid but will leak; the kernel will only ensure
that partitioned IRQs cannot leak.
4.3 Domain-switch actions
The running kernel is mostly unaware of domains; domain
switches happen implicitly on a preemption interrupt. As
the kernel is mapped at a fixed address in the virtual address
space, the kernel (code and static data) switch happens im-
plicitly when switching the page-directory pointer. Thus, the
only explicit action needed for completing the kernel switch
is switching the stack (after copying the present stack to the
new one). The kernel detects the need for a stack switch by
comparing the Kernel_Image reference in the destination
thread’s TCB with itself. In addition, the stack switch also
implies actions for satisfying Requirements 1, 3, 4 and 5.
We flush all on-core microarchitectural state (Require-
ment 1) after switching stacks. The multicore version of
seL4 presently uses a big lock for performance and verifiabil-
ity [Peters et al. 2015]; we release the lock before flushing.
To reset on-core state on Arm, we flush the L1 caches
(DCCISW and ICIALLU), TLBs (TLBIALL), and BP (BPIALL).
On x86 we flush the TLBs (invpcid) and use the new indirect
branch control (IBC) feature [Intel 2018b] for flushing the BP.
Flushing the L1-D and -I caches presents a challenge on x86.
While it has an instruction for flushing the complete cache
hierarchy, wbinvd, it has no instruction for selectively flush-
ing L1 caches. We therefore implement a “manual” flush: The
kernel performing a load operation on one word cache line
of a L1-D-sized buffer. It flushes the L1-I cache by following
a sequence of jumps through a cache-sized buffer, which also
indirectly flushes the branch target buffer (BTB).6
6This “manual” flush is dependent on assumptions on the hardware’s (un-
documented) line replacement policy, making it a brittle and potentially
incomplete mechanism. Intel recently added support for flushing the L1-D
6
For addressing Requirement 4, an authorised thread (e.g.
the cloner) may configure a switching latency. The kernel
defers returning to user mode until the configured time is
elapsed since the preemption interrupt. For policy-freedom
we make this latency a user-controlled kernel-image at-
tribute, as a safe value requires a worst-case execution time
analysis, and the need for padding should be defined by the
security policy. For example, with a hierarchical security
policy such as Bell-LaPadula, flushing may not be needed
when switching to a higher classification level. The padding
latency is taken from the kernel active prior to the switch.
Satisfying Requirement 3 is much simplified by cloning,
as the kernels share almost no data (Section 4.1). We achieve
determinism by carefully prefetching all shared data before
returning to userland, by touching each cache line. This will
force the required data into the L1 cache, and ensure deter-
ministic kernel exit. It is done just prior to the padding of the
domain-switch latency, as the cost of loading these lines will
depend their residency in lower-level caches. Prefetching is
not needed for instructions, as kernel code is coloured.
To satisfy Requirement 5, we mask all interrupts before
switching the kernel stack, and after switching unmask the
ones associated with the new kernel. On x86, interrupts
are controlled by a hierarchical interrupt routing structure,
all the bottom-layer interrupts are eventually routed to the
interrupt controllers on CPU cores. Because the kernel exe-
cutes with interrupts disabled, there exists a race condition,
where an interrupt is still accepted by the CPU just after the
bottom-level IRQ source has been masked off. The kernel re-
solves this by probing any possible pending interrupts after
masking, acknowledging them at the hardware level. Arm
systems have a much simpler, single-level interrupt control
mechanism, which avoids this race.
Timer-interrupt handling may be delayed due to another
interrupt or system call occurring just before the preemption
timer. We prevent this from delaying the domain switch by
making the padding time long enough to allow for the worst-
case handling time of such a system call or interrupt. A
more sophisticated implementation would, if preemption is
immediate, defer handling of the system call or interrupt
until the next time slice of the same domain.
The steps performed by the kernel when handling a pre-
emption tick are (bold steps are kernel-switch only):
1. acquire the kernel lock
2. process the timer tick normally
3. mask interrupts
4. switch the kernel stack
5. switch thread context (and implicitly the kernel image)
6. release the kernel lock
7. unmask interrupts of the new kernel
8. flush on-core microarchitectural state
cache [Intel 2018a]. However, we cannot use this feature, as a microcode
update is yet to be available for our machine, and there is still no L1-I flush.
9. pre-fetch shared kernel data
10. poll the cycle counter for the configured latency
11. reprogram the timer interrupt
12. restore the user stack pointer and return.
4.4 Kernel destruction
Destroying a kernel in a multicore system creates a race
condition, as the kernel that is being destroyed may be active
on other cores. For safe destruction, we first suspend all
threads belonging to the target kernel. We support this with
a per-kernel bitmap that indicates the cores on which it is
presently running, it is updated during kernel switch.
During Kernel_Image destruction, the kernel first inval-
idates the target kernel capability (turning the kernel into
a “zombie” object). It then triggers a system_stall event,
which sends IPIs to all cores where the zombie is presently
running; this is analogous to TLB shoot-down. The cores
then schedule the idle thread belonging to the default Ker-
nel_Image (created at boot time). Similarly, the kernel sends
a TLB_invalidate IPI to all the cores that the target kernel
had been running on. Lastly, the initial core completes the
destruction and cleanup of the zombie.
Destroying active Kernel_Memory also invalidates the
kernel, resulting in the same sequence of actions. Destroying
either object invalidates the kernel, allowing the remaining
object to be destroyed without complications.
The existence of an always runnable idle thread is a core
invariant of seL4; we must maintain this in the face of dy-
namic kernel creation and destruction. We ensure the initial
kernel image (and idle thread) remain, by not providing the
initial kernel’s Kernel_Memory capability to userland. This
guarantees that there is still a kernel with an idle thread, even
if userland destroys the last Kernel_Image. Such a system
will have no user-level threads, and will do nothing more
than acknowledging timer ticks.
A more sophisticated solution might allow reusing the
initial kernel’s memory, where the intention is to keep the
system partitioned for its lifetime. This is hardly worthwhile,
as the amount of dead memory is tiny: on x86 it is 216 KiB
on a single core or 300KiB on a 4-core machine, including
the buffers for flushing the L1 caches. Corresponding Arm
sizes are 120 KiB and 168KiB.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate our approach in terms of its ability to close
timing channels, as well as its effect on system performance.
5.1 Methodology
We quantify leakage using mutual information (MI) [Shan-
non 1948] as a measure of the size of a channel. Wemodel the
channel as a pipe into which the sender places inputs, drawn
from some input set I (the secret values), and the receiver
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obtains outputs from some set O (the attacker’s time mea-
surements). In the case of a cache attack, the input could be
the number of cache sets the sender accesses and the output
is the time it takes the receiver to access a previously-cached
buffer. MI indicates the average number of bits of informa-
tion that a computationally unbounded receiver can learn
from each input by observing the output.
We model the time measurements as a probability density
function, meaning that we calculate the MI between discrete
inputs and continuous outputs. If we treated the output time
measurements as purely discrete then we would be treating
all values as unordered and equivalent, e.g. a collection of
unique particularly high values would not be treated dif-
ferently from a collection of unique uniformly distributed
values, therefore we might miss a leak. Furthermore, for a
uniform input distribution, if continuous MI is zero then it
implies that other similar measures, such as discrete capac-
ity [Shannon 1948], are also zero. As it is an average function,
rather than a maximum, MI is also easier to reliably estimate,
making it an effective metric to see if a leak exists or not.
We send a large number of inputs and collect the corre-
sponding outputs. From this we use kernel density estima-
tion [Silverman 1986] to estimate the probability density
function of outputs for each input. We then use the rectan-
gle method (see e.g. [Hughes-Hallet et al. 2005] p. 340) to
estimate the MI between a uniform distribution on inputs
and the observed outputs, which we write asM.
Sampling introduces noise, which will result in an appar-
ent non-zero MI even when no channel exists. Sampled data
can never prove that a leak does not exist, so instead we ask
if the data collected contains any evidence of an information
leak. Our present tool has a resolution of about 1 millibit, so
cannot give conclusive evidence ifM < 1mb, but such chan-
nels can be considered negligible anyway. If the estimated
leakage is higher than this we use the following test [Chothia
and Guha 2011; Chothia et al. 2013] to distinguish noise in
the sampling process from a significant leak.
Table 1. Hardware platforms.
System Haswell (x86) Sabre (Arm v7)
Microarchitecture Haswell Cortex A9
Processor/SoC Core i7-4770 i.MX 6Q
Cores × threads 4 × 2 4 × 1
Clock 3.4 GHz 0.8 GHz
Cache line size 64 B 32 B
L1-D/L1-I cache 32 KiB, 8-way 32KiB, 4-way
L2 cache 256 KiB, 8-way 1MiB, 16-way
L3 cache 8MiB, 16-way N/A
I-TLB 64, 8-way 32, 1-way
D-TLB 64, 4-way 32, 1-way
L2-TLB 1024, 8-way 128, 2-way
RAM 16GiB 1GiB
We simulate the measurement noise of a zero-leakage
channel by shuffling the outputs in our dataset to randomly
chosen inputs. This produces a dataset with the same range
of values, but the random assignment ensures that there is
no relation between the inputs and outputs (i.e., zero leak-
age). We calculate the MI from this new dataset and repeat
100 times, giving us 100 estimations from channels that are
guaranteed to have zero leakage. From this we calculate the
mean and standard deviation of these results, and then cal-
culate the exact 95% confidence interval for an estimate to
be compatible with zero leakage, which we write asM0.
If the estimate of MI from the original dataset is outside
the 95% confidence interval, i.e.M > M0, the observations
are inconsistent with the MI being zero, and so there is a
leak (the strict inequality is important here, because for very
uniform data with no leakageM may equalM0). Otherwise
we conclude that the dataset does not contain evidence of
an information leak.
Unlike some prior work [Liu et al. 2015; Maurice et al.
2017], our aim is not to construct high capacity channels.
Instead, we aim to demonstrate the existence or absence of
a channel, so we usually choose unsophisticated encodings.
5.2 Hardware platforms
We conduct our experiments on representatives of the x86
and Arm architectures; Table 1 gives the details. Our Arm
platform is somewhat dated, but we have not yet ported
our time protection implementation to the Arm v8 architec-
ture, which is used by the more recent cores. Furthermore,
our earlier work demonstrated that recent (out-of-order)
Arm cores contain microarchitectural state that cannot be
scrubbed by architected means, and thus contain uncloseable
high-bandwith channels [Ge et al. 2018a].
We evaluate leakage in three scenarios: raw refers to the
unmitigated channel while protected refers to our imple-
mentation of time protection, using two coloured domains
with cloned kernels, each is allocated 50% of available colours
unless stated otherwise.
For intra-core channels we additionally evaluate full
flush, which performs a maximal architecture-supported
reset of microarchitectural state. On Arm, this adds flushing
the L2 cache to the flush operations used for time protec-
tion (as described in Section 4.3), and we also disable the BP
and prefetcher for minimising uncontrollable microarchitec-
ture state. On x86 the full flush scenario omits the “manual”
L1 cache flush and instead flushes the whole cache hierar-
chy (wbinvd), and disables the data prefetcher by updating
MSR 0x1A4 [Viswanathan 2014].
As a base line we measure the worst-case direct and indi-
rect costs of flushing the (uncolourable) L1-I/D caches vs. the
complete cache hierarchy. The direct cost is the combined
latency of the flush instructions when all D-cache lines are
dirty (or the cost of the “manual flush” on x86). We measure
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Table 2. Worst-case cost of cache flushes (µs). The direct
cost of the x86 L1 flush (bold) would be about 1 µs with a
hardware-supported L1 I-cache flush.
Cache x86 Arm
dir ind total dir ind total
L1 only 26 1 27 20 25 45
Full flush 270 250 520 380 770 1, 150
the indirect cost as the one-off slowdown experienced by an
application whose working set is the size of the cache.
Table 2 shows results. The surprisingly high L1-flush cost
on x86 is a result of our “manual” flush: the L1-D flush is
<0.5 µs, the rest is for the L1-I, where each of the chained
jumps (Section 4.3) is mis-predicted. Actual flush instructions
should reduce the overall L1 flush cost to well below 1µs.
To put these figures into context, consider that cache
flushes would only be required on a timer tick, which is
typically in the order of 10–100ms. Furthermore, the indi-
rect cost of an L1 flush is irrelevant in practice: It would
be highly unusual for a process to find any hot data in the
L1 after another domain has been executing for a full time
slice. We see from these results that flushing the L1 can be
expected to add well below 1% overhead, while flushing the
whole cache hierarchy will add substantial overheads.
5.3 Timing channel mitigation efficacy
To cover the attack scenarios listed in Section 3.1, we demon-
strate a covert timing channel with a shared kernel image
(Section 5.3.1), intra-core (Section 5.3.2) and inter-core (Sec-
tion 5.3.3) timing channel benchmarks that exploit conflicts
on all levels of caches, and a timing channel based on domain
switching latency (Section 5.3.4).
5.3.1 Timing channel via a shared kernel image
As discussed in Section 2.4, partitioning user space automat-
ically partitions dynamic kernel data (and will defeat e.g.
page-table side-channel attacks [van Schaik et al. 2018]). We
now demonstrate that it is insufficient for mitigating covert
channels.
We implement an LLC covert channel between coloured
user-space processes. The sender sends information by trig-
gering system calls, while the receiver, sharing the same core
with a time slice of 1ms, monitors the cache misses on the
cache set that a kernel uses for serving the system calls.
The receiver firstly builds a probe buffer with the prime&
probe technique [Liu et al. 2015; Osvik et al. 2006; Percival
2005]: it compares the cache misses on the probed cache
sets before and after executing the system call, then marks
a cache set as an attack set if the number of cache misses
increase after the system returns.
The sender encodes a random sequence of symbols from





































Figure 3. Kernel timing-channel matrix on x86, showing the
conditional probability of output symbols (LLCmisses) given
an input symbol (system call). The top graph shows coloured
userland only, where MI observed from a sample size of
255,790 is 0.79 bits, which we write as M = 0.79 b, n =
255, 790. The bottom graph is with full time protection,M =
0.6mb,M0 = 0.1mb, n = 255, 040 (1mb = 10−3 bits).
TCB_SetPriority for 1, Poll for 2, and idling for 3. Figure 3
(top) shows the resulting channel matrix, i.e. the conditional
probability of observing an output symbol given a particular
input symbol, shown as a heat map. A channel is indicated by
output symbols (cache misses) being correlated with input
symbols (system calls), i.e. variations of probability (colour)
along horizontal lines. Signal and TCB_SetPriority lead
to 500–700 misses, while Poll and idle result in 200–600
misses, a clear channel. The MI ofM=0.79 bit per iteration
(2ms) means the cannel can transmit 395 b/s.
With cloned kernels the channel disappears (bottom of
Figure 3). The remaining channel is measured asM = 0.6
millibits (mb), which is below the resolution of our tool and
negligible. We implement a similar channel on the Arm,
observing a non-trivial MIM = 20 mb, which reduces to
M = 0.0mb with time protection.
5.3.2 Intra-core timing channels
We investigate the full set of channels exploitable by pro-
cesses time-sharing a core, targeting the L1-I, L1-D and L2
caches, the TLB, the BTB, and the branch history buffer
(BHB). We use a prime&probe attack, where the receiver
measures the timing on probing a defined number of cache
sets or entries.
We use theMastik [Yarom 2017] implementation of the L1-
D cache channel, the output symbol is the time to perform
the attack on every cache set. The L2 channel is the same,
with a probing set large enough to cover that cache. We
build the L1-I channel by having the sender probe with jump
instructions that map to corresponding cache sets [Acıiçmez
2007; Acıiçmez et al. 2010]. For the TLB channel, the sender
probes the TLB entries by reading an integer from a number
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Table 3.Mutual information capacityM (in mb) of unmiti-
gated (raw) intra-core timing channels, mitigated with full
cache flush (full flush) and time protection (protected).M0 is
the 95% confidence bound for a zero channel. Bold values rep-
resent a definite channel (M > M0), others are consistent
with no channel or below the 1mb tool resolution.
Platform Cache Raw Full flush Protected
M M M0 M M0
x86 L1-D 4,000 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
L1-I 300 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.5
TLB 2,300 0.5 0.5 16.8 23.9
BTB 1,500 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4
BHB 1,000 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
L2 2,700 2.3 2.6 50.5 3.7
Arm L1-D 2,000 1 1 30.2 39.7
L1-I 2,500 1.3 1.3 4.9 5.2
TLB 600 0.5 0.5 1.9 2.2
BTB 7.5 4.1 4.4 62.2 73.5
BHB 1,000 0 0.5 0.2 54.4
of consecutive pages. We use chained branch instructions as
the probing buffer for the BTB channel, the sender probing
3584–3712 branch instructions on Haswell, 0–512 on Sabre.
Our BHB channel is the same as the residual state-based
covert channel [Evtyushkin et al. 2016], where the sender
sends information by either taking or skiping a conditional
jump instruction. The receiver measures the latency on a
similar conditional jump instruction, sensing any speculative
execution caused by the sender’s history.
Table 3 summarises results for the three scenarios defined
in Section 5.2. The raw scenario shows a large channel in
each case, except for the Arm BTB. On the Sabre we find
that all channels are effectively mitigated by the full flush as
well as the protected scenario.
On Haswell, the picture is the same, except for a residual
L2 channel. While the full flush closes it, our implementation
of time protection (which colours the L2) leaves a sizeable
channel of 50mb. Further investigation shows that the chan-
nel is decreased toM = 6.4 mb (M0 = 4.1 mb) if we disable
the agressive data prefetcher – obviously this state machine
is not reset by the mechanisms we have at our disposal for
implementing time protection (manual L1-I and L1-D flush
plus IBC). The remaining small channel likely results from
the instruction prefetcher, which cannot be disabled.
This result is strong evidence for our previously-argued
need of a better hardware-software contract for controlling
any hidden microarchitecture state [Ge et al. 2018a].
5.3.3 Cross-core LLC channel
Recall that for cross-core attacks, our threat scenario only
considers side channels. The only medium for these on both
















Figure 4. Unmitigated concurrent LLC side-channel attack
on x86. The pattern at set 119 shows the victim’s cache
footprint detected by the spy.
for LLC-based cross-core side channels by reproducing the
attack of Liu et al. [2015] on GnuPG version 1.4.13. The attack
targets the square-and-multiply implementation of modular
exponentiation used as part of the ElGamal decryption.
We use two processes, executing concurrently on sepa-
rate cores on the Haswell. The victim repeatedly decrypts
a file, whereas the spy uses the Mastik implementation of
the LLC prime&probe attack to capture the victim’s cache
activity, searching for patterns that correspond to the use of
the square function. The cache activity learned by the spy
is shown in Figure 4. On cache set number 119, we see a
sequence of dots separated by intervals of varying lengths.
Each of these dots is an invocation of the square function
and the secret key is encoded in the length of the intervals
between the dots, with long intervals encoding ones and
short intervals zeros. We find that time protection closes the
channel (in this case by colouring the LLC), the spy can no
longer detect any cache activity of the victim.
5.3.4 Cache-flush channel
To demonstrate the cache-flush channel we create a receiver
that observes its progress by monitoring a cycle counter,
waiting for a large jump in the counter value, indicating
preemption. Online time measures the uninterrupted period,
while offline time is the length of the jump.
The sender, running on the same core, varies the number
of cache sets it accesses in each time slice, manipulating the
cost of the kernel’s L1 cache flushes, and thus the receiver’s

















Figure 5. Unmitigated cache-flush channel, showing
receiver-observed offline time vs. the sender’s cache foot-
print on Arm.M = 1.4 b, n = 1828
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Table 4. Channel resulting from cache-flush latency (mb)
without and with time protection.
Platform Timing No pad Protected
M M M0
x86 Online 8.4 0.5 0.5
pad = 58.8 µs Offline 8.3 0.6 0.6
Arm Online 1,400 16.3 24.6





















Figure 6. Unmitigated interrupt channel, showing receiver-
observed online time vs. the timer interrupt configured by
the Trojan,M = 902mb, n = 10, 860. Bechmarked on the
Haswell platform.
Figure 5 shows that the sender effectively modulates the
offline time. Table 4 shows that the channel exists on both
architectures, but is effectively closed with time padding.
5.3.5 Interrupt channel
We evaluate the interrupt partitioning with a timing channel
based on a timer interrupt. The Trojan and spy execute on the
same core, with a 10ms system tick. For sending information,
the Trojan programs the timer to fire after 13–17ms and
then sleeps for the rest of its time slice; this ensures that the
timer fires approximately 3–7ms into the spy’s time slice.
Figure 6 shows that the spy, which is identical to the one
of Section 5.3.4, experiences two on-line periods per time
slice, before and after the interrupt, resulting in a strong
channel of 0.9 b per time slice. IRQ partitioning results in an
uninterrupted time slice for the spy, and a closed channel
(M = 0.5mb,M0 = 0.7mb, n = 11, 029).
5.4 Performance
5.4.1 IPC microbenchmarks
We evaluate the performance impact of time protection by
measuring the cost of the most important (and highly opti-
mised) microkernel operation, cross-address-space message-
passing IPC. Table 5 summarises the results,7 where Colour
ready refers to a kernel supporting time protection with-
out using it, intra-colour measures IPC that does not cross
domains (kernels), while inter-colour does. The last is an arti-
ficial case that does not use a fixed time slice or time padding
(which would defer IPC delivery to the partition switch). We
7Note that we are not using the mainline kernel, the cycle counts here are
not comparable to what can be found on the seL4 web site.
Table 5. IPC microbenchmark performance and slowdown.
x86 Arm
Version Cycles Slowd. Cycles Slowd.
original 381 - 344 -
colour-ready 386 1% 391 14%
intra-colour 380 0% 395 15%
inter-colour 378 -1% 389 13%
use this to examine the baseline cost of our mechanisms.
Standard deviations from 30 runs are less than 1%.
We find that time protection adds negligible overhead on
x86. On Arm, in contrast, there is a significant baseline cost
for supporting the kernel clone mechanism. This is a result
of the fact that the baseline kernel uses global mappings
to map the kernel’s virtual address space. With multiple
kernels, this is no longer possible. As the L2 TLB of the
Cortex A9 processor, on which the Sabre is based, is only
2-way associative, these additional kernel mappings result in
a significant increase of conflict misses on the cross-address-
space IPC. There is no further overhead from using cloning.
Note that Arm v8 cores have 4-way associativity, so we
expect this overhead to be significantly reduced on the more
recent architecture version.
5.4.2 Domain switch cost
In Table 2 we measured the worst-case cache-flush costs. We
expect those to dominate the cost added to domain switches
by time protection. We test this hypothesis by measuring the
domain-switch latency (without padding) for a number of
our attack workloads; specifically the time taken to switch
from the receiver of a prime&probe attack to an idle domain.
We report the mean for 320 runs, all standard deviations are
less than 1% (Arm) or 3% (x86). An exception is the LLC test,
where original seL4 times have a bimodal distribution and
we report median values (standard deviation: 25% for Arm,
18% for x86).
Table 6 shows the results for our three defence scenarios.
We observe first that the workload dependence of the latency
evident in the raw system has mostly vanished from the de-
fended systems, even without padding. These benchmarks
Table 6. Absolute cost (µs) with no padding of switching
away from a domain running various receivers from Sec-
tion 5.3.2.
Platf. Mode Idle L1-D L1-I L2 L3
x86 Raw 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.5
Full flush 271 271 271 271 271
Protected 30 30 30 30 30
Arm Raw 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.6 N/A
Full flush 414 414 414 414 N/A
Protected 27 27 27 31 N/A
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establish a lower bound on the safe padding time. We sec-
ondly notice that, as expected, the full flush latencies match
the flush costs of Table 2. With time protection, the switch
latency is slightly higher than the direct L1-flush cost of
Table 2, confirming our hypothesis that this is the dominant
cost, and also supporting the comment in Section 5.2 that
indirect flush cost are of little relevance for L1 caches.
Most importantly, the results show that our implementa-
tion of time protection imposes significantly less overhead
than the full flush, despite being as effective in removing
timing channels (except for the issues resulting from the lack
of targeted cache flushes discussed in Section 5.3.2). Looking
at these numbers in the context of a 10ms time slice, we can
see that the relative overhead of a full flush would be about
3% in x86 and 4% on the Arm, while for our implementation
of time protection it is only about 0.3% on both processors.
5.4.3 Kernel cloning and destruction cost
Table 7 shows the cost of cloning and destroying kernel
images. We can see that the clone cost is a fraction of that
of creating a process in Linux on the same hardware, while
destroying a kernel is 1–2 orders of magnitude faster still.
5.4.4 The cost of cache colouring
Cache partitioning (through colouring) as we use it for imple-
menting time protection replaces the dynamic partitioning
done by hardware by a static (although OS-changeable) par-
titioning. This can be expected to lead to somewhat less
optimal use of the cache and thus a performance cost, a well-
understood tradeoff. However, static partitioning also leads
to more predictable performance, which was the original
motivation for it [Kessler and Hill 1992; Liedtke et al. 1997;
Lynch et al. 1992]. More recently, cache colouring has also
been proposed as a way for improving performance [Han
et al. 2018; Noll et al. 2018].
Nevertheless, using it as part of mandatory security en-
forcement will in average lead to some performance degra-
dation, particularly if the cache is shared between an appli-
cation with a large and one with a small footprint. Here we
will try to get an idea for the size of this effect, by running a
single benchmark with a reduced (to 75% or 50%) cache size.
Our seL4 kernel with time protection is a research proto-
type, which lacks a Posix-like environment that is expected
by most benchmarks, such as SPEC. As an easily portable
benchmark suite we use Splash-2 [Woo et al. 1995]. These
are obviously quite dated, but for our purposes all we need
Table 7. Cost of cloning (µs) vs. Linux process creation.
seL4 Linux
Arch clone destroy fork+exec
x86 79 0.6 257



































































Figure 7. Slowdowns of Splash-2 benchmarks against base-
line kernel without partitioning for x86 (top) and Arm and
geometric mean. Benchmarks are run as the only process
on the system. The “base” cases use the standard kernel
with reduced cache, the “cloned” cases run the benchmark
on a cloned kernel with the “100% colours” case using an
unpartitioned cache like the baseline.
is something that exercises the LLC. We set the running pa-
rameters to consume 220MiB of heap and 1MiB of stack. We
omit the volrend program due to its Linux dependencies.
Figure 7 shows the slowdown resulting from cache colour-
ing and kernel cloning. We report the mean of 10 repeated
single-threaded runs (standard deviations are below 3%), as
well as the geometric mean across the suite. The benchmark-
ing thread is the only user thread in the system.
On the Arm, cache colouring introduces less than 1% slow-
down for benchmarks, except raytrace, which shows a 6.5%
slowdown when executing with 50% of the cache, as this
benchmark has a large cache working set. However, given
a 75% cache share, the slowdown drops to 2.5%. On top of
this, running on a cloned kernel adds almost no performance
penalty, except on waterspatial, where it is still below 0.5%.
On Haswell, we observe slightly larger performance over-
heads, as we partition based on colours of the relatively small
(256 KiB) L2 cache (which implicitly colours the LLC). The
alternative would be to only colour the LLC and flush the L2,
at the expense of increased domain-switching cost. With no
targeted L2 flush supported by the architecture, this seems
not worthwhile. Still, the majority of the Splash-2 tests only
slow down by less than 2%. Increasing cache share to 75%
limits the overhead to below 3.5%. As for Arm, kernel cloning
adds close to zero overhead.
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Table 8. Performance impact on Splash-2 of time protection
with 50% colours, including the increased context-switch
latency in a time-shared setup, with and without padding.
On x86, overhead is highest (Max) on ocean and lowest (Min)
on raytrace, on Arm Max is Raytrace, Min is Radix.
x86 Arm
Pad Max Min Mean Max Min Mean
no 10.96% 0.26% 2.76% 6.73% -2.88% 0.75%
yes 11.06% 0.86% 3.38% 7.11% -2.55% 1.09%
5.4.5 The impact of domain switches
The above evaluation of partitioning and cloned kernel
images does not show the effect of the increased context-
switching cost resulting fromflushing on-core state. To evalu-
ate we rerun the Splash-2 benchmarks, now time-sharing the
processor with an idle domain. This measures the effective
reduction of CPU bandwidth from the increased context-
switch latency.
Table 8 shows the result for both architectures. Specifi-
cally we show the benchmarks with the highest and lowest
overhead as well as the geometric mean across the suite.
Without padding, the additional context-switch cost is mini-
mal, indicated by the mean being only slightly higher than in
Figure 7. Padding adds very little on top of that, 0.5% on x86
and 0.3% on Arm. This is consistent with our expectations,
see the discussion of Table 2 in Section 5.2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Strengths and limitations of time protection
The evaluation shows that our implementation of time pro-
tection in seL4 is generally highly effective, and low-cost.
In particular, there is negligible cost of running on a cloned
kernel (except on our Arm v7 processor with its low TLB
associativity), and so are memory overheads, of the order of
100KiB per kernel image and core. Kernel image creation
and destruction is fully dynamic and cheap, compared to the
cost of creating Linux processes (leave alone whole VMs).
Also, time protection consists of a suite of mechanisms
that remove interference on different classes of resources; the
threat model determines which are needed. E.g. in a Cloud
scenario, where timing channels but not covert channels are
an issue, the most expensive operation, padding of domain-
switches to their worst-case latency, may not be needed.
Just as with a multikernel, the separate kernel images do
not prevent sharing of user-level state, if allowed by the
security policy. E.g. shared memory can be set up with a
dedicated colour; the resulting channel would need to be
prevented by ensuring deterministic user-level access.
Re-allocating memory between security domains is possi-
ble in principle, and could be supported by ballooning [Wald-
spurger 2002], but the granularity would have to be that
of a full cache colour, making it fairly expensive. This is a
inevitable consequence of lack of hardware support for more
fine-grained cache partitioning; if better support becomes
available, time protection can make use of it.
Time protection is obviously at themercy of hardware, and
not all hardware provides sufficient support for full temporal
isolation. We have seen this with the x86 L2 channel in
Table 3, which we could not close. We traced this to the
prefetcher, which retains state we cannot flush without a
(prohibitively expensive) flush of the full cache hierarchy.
Prior to Intel adding the IBC feature in a recent microcode
update, the situationwasmuchworse [Ge et al. 2018a], which
indicates that Intel could easily do more. Our earlier work
also shows that recent Arm processors have similar problems,
but as the Arm ISA is not microcoded, it may be impossible
to fix those security holes on existing processors.
The results reinforce the need for a new, security-oriented
hardare-software contract. We have specified the require-
ment on such a contract in detail [Ge et al. 2018a], but it can
be summarised as requiring that:
• the OS must be able to partition or flush any shared
hardware resource
• concurrently-accessed resources must be partitioned
• virtually-addressed state must be flushed.
The resource forwhich contemporary hardwaremost obvi-
ously fails to satisfy this contract is the interconnect (busses),
which cannot be partitioned – this is the reason why we had
to omit cross-core timing channels from our threat model.
While we have argued that these are not relevant in some
important scenarios (see Section 3.1.2), if would clearly be de-
sirable to apply time protection more generally. For example
requiring single-core execution when confining JavaScript
code in a browser is very restrictive. Alas, we are powerless
without appropriate hardware support.
The number of available colours is a potential bottleneck,
especially in a Cloud scenario. Note that in this case only the
LLC needs to be coloured, which has more colours than the
private L2 (32 vs. 8 colours on our Haswell). Furthermore,
the hashing scheme used on the distributed shared LLC on
recent Intel processors increases the number of colours over
that resulting from cache associativity alone [Yarom et al.
2015]. But there is potential for further hardware support.
6.2 Time protection in other systems
There is no reason time protection cannot be implemented in
other systems, although seL4’s design-for-isolation approach
simplifies many things, in particular partitioning kernel data.
Systems like Linux have a kernel heap and far more static
global data, all of which must be partitioned or deterministic
access enforced. While this is probably challenging to do,
there is no fundamental reason why it could not be done.
Cloning a large kernel, such as Linux, will also be more
expensive, yet another argument in favor of a microkernel
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design. A (small-ish, although still large compared to seL4)
hypervisor such as Xen is probably an easier target.
7 Related Work
Deterministic systems eliminate timing channels by provid-
ing only virtual time; Determinator [Aviram et al. 2010] is
an example aimed at clouds. Ford [2012] extends this model
with scheduled IO. Stopwatch [Li et al. 2013] virtualises time
by running three replicas of a system, then only announces
externally-visible timing events at the median of the times
determined by the replicas. The system is effective but at a
heavy performance penalty.
Bershad et al. [1994]; Kessler and Hill [1992] proposed
page colouring for performance isolation. Liedtke et al.
[1997] proposed the same for improved real-time predictabil-
ity, while Shi et al. [2011] proposed dynamic page colouring
for mitigating attacks against cryptographic algorithms in
the hypervisor. StealthMem [Kim et al. 2012] uses colouring
to provide some safe storage with controlled cache residency.
CATalyst [Liu et al. 2016] uses Intel’s CAT technology for
LLC partitioning for a similar purpose.
Percival [2005] proposed hardware-supported partitioning
of the L1 cache, while Wang and Lee [2007] suggested hard-
ware mechanisms for locking cache lines, called a partition-
locked cache (PLcache). Ge et al. [2018a] investigate short-
comings in architectural support for preventing timing chan-
nels and propose an extended hardware-software contract.
Spectre, Meltdown and Foreshadow (L1TF) [Kocher et al.
2019; Lipp et al. 2018; Van Bulck et al. 2018;Weisse et al. 2018]
exploit covert channels to exfiltrate information from specu-
latively executed instructions. Among the countermeasures
for these attacks, Intel introduced instructions for flushing
the branch predictor [Intel 2018b] and the L1-D cache [Intel
2018a]; we use these in our implementation. Other counter-
measures for these attacks aremostly orthogonal to our work.
Our design is effective at preventing cross-security-domain
Spectre attacks, the other attacks can only be prevented with
(forthcoming) improvements to the hardware.
The idea of using multiple kernel images on a single sys-
tem has been proposed in the past for supporting multi-core
platforms. Corey [Boyd-Wickizer et al. 2008] enhances many-
core scalability by letting the application control the degree
of sharing of kernel data structures. Helios [Nightingale et al.
2009] uses satellite kernels with a common API for seam-
lessly supporting heterogenous computing elements. Multi-
kernels [Baumann et al. 2009] run per-core, shared-nothing
kernel images. Barrellfish/DS [Zellweger et al. 2014] sepa-
rates OS kernel images from physical CPU cores, to support
hot-plugging and energy management.
8 Conclusions
We proposed, implemented and evaluated time protection,
a mandatory, black-box kernel mechanism for preventing
microarchitectural timing channels. It employs a combina-
tion of partitioning and flushing of shared hardware. We
eliminate channels through a shared kernel image through a
policy-free kernel clone mechanism that allows almost com-
plete partitioning of the kernel. It allows constructing a sys-
tem that runs on each core a separate kernel for each security
domain, and also supports partitioning of interrupts, to com-
pletely prevent any cross-domain temporal interference.
Our evaluation shows that the mechanisms are effective
in closing all examined timing channels, while imposing
small to negligible overhead. However, we also observe
that present hardware has significant shortcomings in its
support for preventing interference. This finding strongly
supports our earlier claim that the ISA is an insufficient
hardware-software contract for providing true security, and
that we need an improved, security-oriented contract [Ge
et al. 2018a]. Ideally this contract will also support partition-
ing interconnect channels (see Section 2.3), allowing time
protection to prevent inter-core covert channels (see Sec-
tion 3.1).
Despite those hardware-inflicted limitations, we claim
that the concept of time protection general and overdue.
Implementations will be able to adapt as hardware improves,
and provide better security to a growing class of use cases
Time protection comprises a suite of kernel mechanisms.
Proper integration into the seL4 API is future work, espe-
cially combining it with the recently added temporal in-
tegrity mechanisms [Lyons et al. 2018]. Our ultimate aim is
a verified seL4 with time protection. We have some ideas on
how to achieve this [Heiser et al. 2019] but these are rather
speculative at this point.
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